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The empirical evidence upon the macroeconomic performances of the independent central banks 
do not always have been successfully. In some cases, the consistency of the indices based on the 
interpretation  of  central  banks  statues  used  for  measuring  the  degree  of  central  bank 
independence is controversial, particularly for some of the indices. Moreover, the correlations 
between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance variables are not always 
confirmed,  the  causal  relationship  between  central  bank  independence  and  inflation  is 
controversial, and the higher disinflation costs, as a result of a higher sacrifice ratio correlated 
with the degree of independence is controversial, too. The effects of central bank independence 
upon macroeconomic performances focalized upon the empirical evidence of inflation, output or 
economic grouth and the disinflation costs. This is due to the lack of studies vis – á – vis of 
relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performances regarding 
some variables like interest rates and budgetary deficits. Specialists consider inflation and output 
as  the  main  determinats  of  the  social  welfare.  The  economic  literature  regarding  this  fact 
suggests that the central bank is seen as a free lunch institution. This hypothesis sustains that 
independent central banks will have social benefits in terms of lower inflation rates, but without 
any costs in terms of the real macroeconomic performances as a higher output volatility or a 
lower  economic  growth.  In  this  article  we  provide  a  qualitative  analyses  regarding  the 
relationship  between  central  bank  independence  and  macroeconomic  performances.  For  this 
purpose the authors’ used the new index for measuring central bank independence and inflation 
targeting based on three pillars: political and legal central bank independence, central bank 
governance and conduct of monetary policy, central bank transparency and accountability. For 
estimating  the  connections  between  the  evolution  of  central  bank  independence  and 
macroeconomic performances we used five macroeconomic variables: GDP in constant prices, 
Harmonised Price Consumer Index, unemployment rate, budgetary deficit and current account 
deficit. Both measuring the degree of central bank independence and evaluating the average 
levels of the macroeconomic variables were analysed in the period 1990 – 2009, within 20 less 
developing countries. The final results will help clarify the complex relationship between central 
bank independence and macroeconomic performances in countries who fostered a large amount 
of institutional shift in recent years. 
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I.  Introduction 
In the past, most central banks around the world had functioned as departments of the Finance 
Ministers.  These  institutions  were  obliged  by  law,  by  custom  or  by  both  to  dispose  of  the 
monetary policy instruments for attaining a large number of objectives, including high levels of 
economic growth and employment, to finance the public spending of the governments by getting  
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funds and solving problems related to the payment balance. Today, contrary to what happened 
twenty five years ago most central banks around the world gain high levels of legal and actual 
central  bank  independence.  Central  bank  independence  and  institutional  arrangement  like 
inflation targeting have become largely accepted mechanisms by many specialists. In this sense, 
the  prior  responsibility  of  the  central  bank  is  attaining  and  maintaining  price  stability  and 
financial stability. 
The reasons behind this institutional shift in the structure of the central banks differ from country 
to  country.  In  the  European  Union,  some  amendments  brought  to  the  central  banks  statues 
imposed in order to accomplish legal convergence imposed by the Maastricht Treaty and the 
European System of Central Banks Statue. An example in this sense is the amendments brought  
to  law  no.  22  of  December  1997  of  the  German  central  bank  who  raised  the  tenure  of  the 
Governing  Board  members  from  two  to  five  years,  abolishing  government  the  veto  right. 
Moreover, price stability has been established as the primary objective of monetary policy. Once 
European  Central  Bank  was  established,  the  monetary  policy  in  the  member  countries  is 
delegated to one supranational institution, with a high degree of legal independence from the 
national governments interests.    
In this paper we focused upon the degree of central bank independence of twenty less developing 
countries and their institutional evolution since 1990 by testing a new index for measuring central 
bank independence and inflation targeting. Moreover, we analyze the compliance between the 
degree  of  central  bank  independence  and  five  important  macroeconomic  variables:  GDP, 
inflation, unemployment rate, budgetary deficit and current account deficit in these twenty less 
developing countries in the period 1990 – 2009. 
 
II.  Track  recorded  of  the  relationship  between  central  bank  independence  and 
macroeconomic performances 
One  of  the  most  important  studies  dealling  with  the  relationship  between  central  bank 
independence  and  macroeconomic  performances  suggests  that  monetary  discipline  associated 
with central bank independence reduces the level and variability of inflation but does not have 
either  large  benefits  or  costs  in  terms  of  macroeconomic  performance.  This  observation 
represents at least a fragment of evidence in support of theories emphasizing the neutrality of 
money (Alesina and Summers 1993: 159). 
Some other studies find a negative correlation between central bank independence and long-
average inflation. They show a negative correlation between independence and long-run average 
government  deficits  as  a  percent  of  GDP.  In  general  they  find  no  evidence  of  a  possible 
correlation between output growth and central bank independence (Pollard 2003: 34).  
Better macroeconomic performance and more efficient policy are present in more credible and, to 
some extent, more transparent central banks. Independence and accountability, to the extent that 
we are able to measure them, do not seem to explain much of the cross-country variation in 
macroeconomic outcomes, either individually or in conjunction with other variables (Cecchetti 
and Krause 2002: 56). 
To  examine  the  links  between  central  bank  independence  and  economic  performance  it  is 
neccesary  to  devise  appropiate  criteria  for  measuring  central  bank  independence.  In  the 
industrialized  countries,  measures  of  central  bank  independence  are  based  mainly  on  the 
intepretation of central bank laws ad therefore concern legal independence only. The construction 
of so-called legal indices is done by structuring those criteria regarded as relevant and assigning 
them a value on the same numerical scale of independence (Healey and Harrison 2004: 109; 
Touffut 2008: 9; Laurens, Arnone, Segalotto 2009: 24). 
The  correlation  between  central  bank  independence  and  inflation  rate  in  the  developed  and 
emerging countries is a positive one; this fact can be justified by the Philips curve, in which  
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governments  prefer  a  decrease  in  the  unemployment  rate  and  an  increase  in  wages,  and 
consequently an automatic increase in the inflation rate (Dumiter 2010a: 185). 
Summarizing, the most important fact is that the different indices used by one or another author 
distorsioned the accuracy of the empirical results because of the gap between de jure and de facto 
independence. In this study, we want to eliminate those problems by analyzing central bank 
independence  and  macroeconomic  performances  through  the  new  index  for  central  bank 
independence and inflation targeting.o find that there is a negative 
correlati find that there is a ne-run average inflation. They also 
III. Estimating the connections and correlations between central bank independence and 
macroeconomic performance in less developing countries 
In  order  to  evaluate  and  assess  the  impact  of  central  bank  independence  regarding  the 
macroeconomic performances we have considered approppriate to use a new index. The new 
index  for  central  bank  indendence  and  inflation  targeting  (ICBIIT)  has  three  main  pillars: 
political and legal central bank independence (PLBCI), central bank governance and conduct of 
monetary policy (CBGCMP), central bank transparency and accountability (CBTA) (Dumiter 
2009a:  39-42).  The  new  index  for  central  bank  independence  and  inflation  targeting  is 
constructed as a sum o thirty eight institutional arrangements both in law and practice of the 
central  banks:  nine  attributed  to  political  and  legal  central  bank  independence,  regarding 
variables like turnover rate of central bank Governor and political vulnerability, tenures of central 
bank  Governor  and  the  members  of  the  Governing  Board,  the  appointment  and  dissmissal 
procedures of the Governor and the members of the governing board; fifteen attributed to central 
bank governance and conduct of monetary policy regarding aspects as: price stability, the central 
bank prevaillance over government in case of policy conflicts, the authority in managing the 
exchange and interest rates, granting direct and indirect credit to the government, the degree of 
central bank independence in setting the monetary policy objectives, targets and instruments; 
fourtheen attributed to central bank transparency and accountability: disclosing time series for the 
main  economic  variables  and  the  macroeconomic  models  used  for  policy  analyses, 
communicating  with  the  public  and  the  media,  announcing  the  current  and  future  paths  of 
monetary policy, auditing central bank activities. 
The index is better called as a de facto or actual index rather than a de jure one, because the 
aggregated value is based on the actual institutional practices or norms of the central banks and 
not necessarily what is written in the central bank laws (Dumiter 2009b: 87). However, the new 
index for central bank independence and inflation targeting is an interpretation based on these 
laws, which are put into actual practice and those practices that are not stipulated by law. 
In order to evaluate the soundness of the index for measuring central bank independence and 
inflation targeting (ICBIIT) it is very important to measure this index in the less developing 
countries. For this purpose we have considered for our study a less developing group formed by 
twenty countries: Argentina, Bostwana, Brasil, Chile, Ghana, Jamaica, Jordan, Malaezia, Mexico, 
Namibia,  Nepal,  Phillippines,  Ruanda,  Saudi  Arabia,  South  Africa,  Sri  Lanka,  Tanzania, 
Thailand, Trinidad Tobago, Zambia, in order to evaluate the degree of central bank independence 
and its evolution in countries with many institutional shifts. The measure was made by analyzing 
central  banks  laws  and  statues,  norms,  regulations,  publications,  studies  and  other  important 
material regarding institutional matters and actual practices of the central banks according to their 
websites in the period 1990 – 2009. 
Given the lack of studies dealling with the relationship between central bank independence and 
macroeconomic performances in the less developing countries we have been focusing upon this 
country group. Measuring central bank independence was made by using the index for central 
bank independence and inflation targeting (Dumiter 2010b: 102-106). The analyses was made by 
comparing  the  levels  of  central  bank  independence  and  the  average  of  five  macroeconomic 
variables in the period 1990 – 2009, as: GDP in constant prices, Harmonized Price Consumer  
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Index (HPCI), unemployment rate (UR), budgetary deficit as a percent of GDP (BG) and current 
account deficit as a percent of GDP(CAD); they were extracted of the International Monetary 
Fund website, World Economic Outlook Database.  
 
IV.  Results  of  measuring  central  bank  independence  and  their  correlation  with  the 
macroeconomic performances in less developing countries 
Measuring central bank independence according to the index of central bank independence and 
inflation  targeting  in  the  less  developing  country  group  (Fig.  no.  1)  has  emerged  with  the 
following results: regarding the first pillar, central bank political and legal independence only a 
few countries: Mexico, Phillippines and Tanzania exhibit higher levels, whereas the rest of the 
countries have lower scores; this is due to the government active participation in the appointment 
and  dissmissal  procedures  of  the  Governor  and  the  members  of  the  Board,  the  political 
vulnerability and the higher turnover rate of the central bank Governor. Moreover, the tenures of 





Fig. no. 1 Measuring central bank independence according to the Index for central bank 
independence and inflation targeting in twenty less developing countries 
Source: realized by authors’ 
 
The  second  pillar  of  the  index,  central  bank  governance  and  conduct  of  monetary  policy, 
measured in the less developing country group reveals in the majority of the countries medium to 
low scores due to some factors as: government prevaillace over the central bank in case of policy 
conflicts, multiple objectives of monetary policy without any prioritisation of one or another, 
financing  government  deficits  in  direct  and  indirect  manners,  government  interference  in 
establishing and managing the interest rate and exchange rate, government active implication in 
establishing and applying monetary policy objectives, targets and instruments. 
With the exception of Chile, country that has adopted the inflation targeting as monetary policy 
strategy,  countries  in  the  less  developing  country  group  attain  lower  levels  of  central  bank 
transparency  and  accountability  pillar,  due  to  some  factors  as:  an  unclear  process  of 
communicating and debating with the public and media regarding the monetary policy stance, 

















































































































































































policy analyses, lack of forecasts regarding inflation and output paths, lack of transparency in 
modifying the path and course of present and future monetary policy.  
Regarding the correlation between the degree of central bank independence and macroeconomic 
performaces in the less developing country group, the results are the following (Fig. no. 2): 
between central bank independence, using the index for central bank independence and inflation 
targeting and GDP countries as: Chile, Phillippines, Ghana and Zambia foster medium levels of 
central bank independence associated with good track record in terms of economic growth, while 
the rest of the countries gathered in this group exhibit lower levels of central bank independence 
and satisfactory levels of GDP. 
Central bank independence and average inflation in the less developing country group are inverse 
correlated in countries as: Argentina, Brasil and Zambia, countries who foster lower levels of 
central bank independence and higher average inflation rates. Other countries as: Phillippines, 
Ghana, Thailand register acceptable levels of central bank independence and lower levels of 
inflation, while the rest of the countries exhibit lower levels both of central bank independence 




Fig. no. 2 Central banks’ macroeconomic performances average in twenty less developing 
countries between 1990 – 2009  
Source: realized by authors’ 
 
For the relationship between central bank independence and average unemployment rate in the 
less developing country group, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Bostwana, Jordan, Jamaica, Nepal, 
Tanzania,  Trinidad  Tobago  and  Zambia,  countries  who  gain  lower  levels  of  central  bank 
independence and higher average levels of the unemployment rate. At the opposite side we can 
remark Argentina, Brasil, Chile, Malaezia, Mexico, Namibia, Ruanda, Sri Lanka and Thailand, 
countries characterized by lower levels of central bank independence and of the unemployment 
rate. 
The relationship between central bank independence and bugdetary deficit in less developing 
countries is split in two parts: in the first one, countries as Trinidad Tobago, Thailand, Bostwana 













































































































































































rest of the countries we can identify an inverse relationship between central bank independence 
and budgetary deficits. 
Finally, the correlation of central bank independence with the curent account deficit is a positive 
one in countries as: Saudi Arabia, Bostwana, Malaezia, Namibia, Ruanda and Trinidad Tobago, 
while  for  the  rest  of  the  countries  of  the  less  developing  group  we  can  identify  an  inverse 
correlation between central bank independence and current account balance. 
 
V. Conclusions 
The vast empirical studies dealling with the relationship between central bank independence and 
macroeconomic performance identify a problem around the construction of the indices regarding 
measuring central bank independence. This situation lead to an inadequate measure of the degree 
of central bank independence in developed and developing countries, results which distort the 
connections with the macroeconomic performances. 
In this article we have used the new index for measuring central bank independence and inflation 
targeting in order to eliminate the differences between de jure and the facto independence to a 
more  accurate  perception of  central  bank  independence.  Moreover,  we  focused  upon  several 
macroeconomic indicators as the average over a twenty years time horizon. The sample that we 
have constructed consists in twenty less developing countries that have envolved in recent years 
both economic and socially.  
The result of our analyses suggests that central bank independence is positively correlated with 
the economic growth in the vast majority of countries, meaning that an increase in the degree of 
independence  will  improve  the  economic  growth.  Regarding  the  inflation  and  employment 
performances and the degree of central bank independence the results are very interesting: some 
countries  with  relatively  independent  central  bank  exhibit  higher  levels  of  inflation  and 
employment, meanwhile other countries with politically dependent central banks gather lower 
levels of inflation and employment. This means that in less developing countries central bank 
independence is not a important factor to explain the inflationary trends and the unemployment 
rate movements. 
Finally,  the  relationship  between  both  current  account  balance  and  budgetary  deficits  are 
emerging: in some countries there is a positive relationship between central bank independence 
and budgetary deficit and current account balance, meanwhile in other countries we can indentify 
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